SB 174
Nicknamed “The Judge’s Bill”
Removes the words "parental rights" and replaces them with "parental responsibilities"
throughout the code --- parents have responsibilities NOT rights, according to the Judges. The
court must appoint a "designated parent" to have legal custody. The switch to the use of
“designated parent” from the current use of residential with cause problems with taxes for
school districts and a major conflict with the language other states use.
Offers no guidance for courts on where to begin. No presumptions--just like now. Courts retain
the ability to decide what they think is the "best" scenario for children. Language changes in
3109.03 negate the policy that the current law has.
Gives courts "complete discretion" over all parenting plans -- which means total power to do
what they "feel is best" no matter what. Even if parents agree! (p164 lines 4851-2)
Within the section on courts there are major inconsistencies between counties. In some
counties only a judge (not magistrates as a currently used) will be able to hear a custody case.
Courts aren't just "approving" plans that parents submit, they get to "issue" one of their own if
they want (p160, line 4740) -- again maximizing their authority.
They tried to sneak in Arizona's language for parenting time but with a caveat of "best interest"
... so parenting plans should "maximize parenting time with both parents" but ONLY WHEN the
court feels it's in the child's best interest (p160, line 4746)
Adds even more factors to consider without guidance on what to DO with those factors. So
courts must apply their personal biases and opinions to even more factors. (page 168-169)
Requires courts to create a plan specific to the child's age and developmental stage -- so this will
effectively codify the Tender Years Doctrine which was debunked ages ago. (page 160, line
4749). All children develop at a different rate and this would require a parenting plan that tries
to take that into consideration which is impossible.
Courts can deny a joint request by both parents for "substantially equal time" if the court thinks
it's "best" (page 163, line 4817), but they will have to at least provide findings for their decision.
Creates additional "best interest" factors, including a parent's "past performance" and parents'
work schedules related to the child's schedule. This allows courts to give preference to a stay-at-
home mom over a working dad, for instance--simply because the dad has a job.
They have new criteria for determining if a parent is "unsuitable" to parent and explicitly state
that they must only apply the preponderance of evidence (the lowest standard there is) when
deciding if a parent is unsuitable. Factors include "abandonment" and "detrimental" (page 165,
lines 4869). This is a huge opportunity to cut out a loving parent for "abandonment" because the
court blames them instead of the alienator who kept a child away. The whole criteria for who is
"unsuitable" is subjective with a very low standard of evidence.
Mothers remain the sole custodian of babies born out of wedlock (page 167, lines 4944) Never
married fathers cannot file for custody or visitation with their child.
A person being "fearful of harm," under preponderance of evidence, is a specified reason to
restrict a parent's responsibilities or time with their children. This undoes the false allegations
clauses they added because it's impossible to disprove "fear.." So we're writing into code that a
mere claim of "fear" is enough to restrict a parent's rights and time. (Lines 5058, 5048-5051,
5187, 5192) This is already being done through ex-parte protection orders, but this codifies the
silver bullet legal maneuver. This is an attempt to confuse civil restraining orders with criminal
restraining orders.
The courts can deny all contact with a child to protect the other parent from domestic violence -
with the same criteria of preponderance of the evidence and the expressed "fear" of the other
parent. (page 176, line 5189)
At any point during the open case, the court can order a multitude of investigations and
evaluations at the parents' expense. (Page 172) What for? To investigate a parent's "character,
past conduct, family relations, etc."
courts must apply their personal biases and opinions to even more factors. (page 168-169)
Requires courts to create a plan specific to the child's age and developmental stage -- so this will
effectively codify the Tender Years Doctrine which was debunked ages ago. (page 160, line
4749). All children develop at a different rate and this would require a parenting plan that tries
to take that into consideration which is impossible.
Courts can deny a joint request by both parents for "substantially equal time" if the court thinks
it's "best" (page 163, line 4817), but they will have to at least provide findings for their decision.
Creates additional "best interest" factors, including a parent's "past performance" and parents'
work schedules related to the child's schedule. This allows courts to give preference to a stay-at-
home mom over a working dad, for instance--simply because the dad has a job.
They have new criteria for determining if a parent is "unsuitable" to parent and explicitly state
that they must only apply the preponderance of evidence (the lowest standard there is) when
deciding if a parent is unsuitable. Factors include "abandonment" and "detrimental" (page 165,
lines 4869). This is a huge opportunity to cut out a loving parent for "abandonment" because the
court blames them instead of the alienator who kept a child away. The whole criteria for who is
"unsuitable" is subjective with a very low standard of evidence.
Mothers remain the sole custodian of babies born out of wedlock (page 167, lines 4944) Never
married fathers cannot file for custody or visitation with their child.
A person being "fearful of harm," under preponderance of evidence, is a specified reason to
restrict a parent's responsibilities or time with their children. This undoes the false allegations
clauses they added because it's impossible to disprove "fear.." So we're writing into code that a
mere claim of "fear" is enough to restrict a parent's rights and time. (Lines 5058, 5048-5051,
5187, 5192) This is already being done through ex-parte protection orders, but this codifies the
silver bullet legal maneuver. This is an attempt to confuse civil restraining orders with criminal
restraining orders.
The courts can deny all contact with a child to protect the other parent from domestic violence -
with the same criteria of preponderance of the evidence and the expressed "fear" of the other
parent. (page 176, line 5189)
At any point during the open case, the court can order a multitude of investigations and
evaluations at the parents' expense. (Page 172) What for? To investigate a parent's "character,
past conduct, family relations, etc."
In Children’s Services Case the evidentiary standard is reduced from clear and convincing to
discretion.
There are conflicts with FERPA (Federal Education Rights of the Parent Act) and conflicts with
current law.
Set military rights during deployment back to before the past updates in 2012.
Allows total strangers to file for custody of a child.
Does not address the multitude of problems that exist with GALs in the state or allow the use of
CASAs.
Does not address guardianship of the disabled.
There are 417 pages here while our proposed bill is 70 pages and saves money.
discretion.
There are conflicts with FERPA (Federal Education Rights of the Parent Act) and conflicts with
current law.
Set military rights during deployment back to before the past updates in 2012.
Allows total strangers to file for custody of a child.
Does not address the multitude of problems that exist with GALs in the state or allow the use of
CASAs.
Does not address guardianship of the disabled.
There are 417 pages here while our proposed bill is 70 pages and saves money.